video-translate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via ingestion points like the instruction, vocabulary, and srt_key fields in the translation request metadata.
  • Ingestion points: Data provided by users or external files enters the agent context through parameters passed to the HeyGen API in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The implementation examples do not include delimiters or specific instructions for the AI to ignore instructions embedded within these fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs network operations using fetch and the requests library to communicate with the API.
  • Sanitization: The code snippets do not show validation or escaping of input strings before they are sent to the external service.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits video URLs and configuration data to api.heygen.com, which is a well-known service for AI video processing. This network activity is the primary function of the skill and is documented neutrally.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The API documentation includes support for a callback_url parameter, which allows the external service to transmit job completion data to a user-defined endpoint.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 01:56 AM