video-translate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via ingestion points like the
instruction,vocabulary, andsrt_keyfields in the translation request metadata. - Ingestion points: Data provided by users or external files enters the agent context through parameters passed to the HeyGen API in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation examples do not include delimiters or specific instructions for the AI to ignore instructions embedded within these fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network operations using
fetchand therequestslibrary to communicate with the API. - Sanitization: The code snippets do not show validation or escaping of input strings before they are sent to the external service.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits video URLs and configuration data to
api.heygen.com, which is a well-known service for AI video processing. This network activity is the primary function of the skill and is documented neutrally. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The API documentation includes support for a
callback_urlparameter, which allows the external service to transmit job completion data to a user-defined endpoint.
Audit Metadata