visual-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function includes extracting visual styles from untrusted external data sources such as website URLs, PDF brand guides, and video files (as documented in
references/extractors/from-website.md,references/extractors/from-pdf.md, andreferences/extractors/from-video.md). If these source files contain malicious instructions, they could influence the agent's behavior during the extraction or application phases. - Ingestion points: External URLs, PDF files, and Video files processed by the agent.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions to ignore commands or natural language instructions that might be embedded within the source data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to generate HTML/CSS (
references/connectors/html-slides.md), create prompts for third-party AI video generators (references/connectors/heygen-video-agent.md), and produce configurations for design tools like Figma. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering logic to prevent processed data from influencing downstream prompt generation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the generation of executable HTML and CSS code through the
references/connectors/html-slides.mdconnector. While intended for presentation slides, this involves generating code based on user-supplied or extracted design parameters. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/connectors/html-slides.mdfile recommends using an external GitHub repository (zarazhangrui/frontend-slides) and fetching assets from Google Fonts as part of the styling workflow.
Audit Metadata