agent-loop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local Python engine (
scripts/run.py) to enforce a seven-phase state machine (bootstrap, perceive, goal_contract, etc.). The agent is instructed to execute this script for every transition, which acts as the authoritative source of truth for the task's progress. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The engine scans the filesystem for policy files (
AGENTS.md) and skill metadata to populate the agent's context. - Ingestion points: The
load_policyfunction inscripts/run.pyreadsAGENTS.mdfrom the home directory and climbs up the directory tree from the current path. Thediscoverfunction readsSKILL.mdfiles from multiple configuration paths. - Boundary markers: Data is passed back to the agent in a structured JSON format, which provides a layer of separation between the file content and the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The script performs file system read and write operations but does not perform network requests or execute arbitrary shell commands.
- Sanitization: The script uses standard JSON parsing and a simple line-based parser for frontmatter metadata, but it does not validate the content of the rules or descriptions it ingests.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically assembles file paths for state persistence using unsanitized input from the execution payload.
- Evidence: In
scripts/run.py, theload_runandsave_runfunctions use a user-providedrunID (e.g.,f"{run_id}.json") and adirparameter to determine where state files are read and written. A malicious payload could potentially use path traversal sequences (e.g.,../../) to read or overwrite JSON files outside the intended.agent-loopdirectory.
Audit Metadata