openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes instructions and rules from project-local configuration files via the openspec CLI, which can be manipulated by malicious repositories to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Artifact instructions and project context are fetched from the
openspec instructionsandopenspec statuscommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is directed to treat the
instructionfield as authoritative guidance. - Capability inventory: File system write access to
resolvedOutputPathand execution ofopenspecCLI commands. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not validate or sanitize the content of the instructions or the output paths provided by the CLI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a logic flow that executes commands specified within data processed at runtime, which could be exploited if that data is compromised.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdstates: "If theinstructionfield delegates creation to a specific skill or command, invoke it to produce the artifact instead of writing the file yourself." - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically determines its operations, including which commands to run and where to write files, based on JSON output from the openspec tool.
- Evidence: The skill uses variables like
resolvedOutputPathandinstructionfrom CLI-generated JSON to drive its actions.
Audit Metadata