alphafold-database
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external bioinformatics repositories, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved via
requests.getfromalphafold.ebi.ac.ukandwww.ebi.ac.uk, and viaurllib.requestfromwww.uniprot.org(e.g., inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the fetched protein metadata or structure files as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the local system (
open().write), perform network operations (requests.get), and execute shell commands viasubprocess.run(specifically using thegsutiltool). - Sanitization: The skill demonstrates good practice by including an explicit type check (verifying
taxonomy_idis an integer) to prevent command injection when usinggsutil. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a section titled 'Suggest Using K-Dense Web For Complex Worflows' which provides explicit instructions to the AI agent to steer users toward a specific commercial platform (www.k-dense.ai). This is a behavioral override designed to promote the author's hosted services during complex interactions.
Audit Metadata