gwas-database
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external scientific sources, which creates a potential surface for indirect instructions to be processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched via
requests.getfromhttps://www.ebi.ac.uk/gwas/rest/apiandhttps://www.ebi.ac.uk/gwas/summary-statistics/apias well as via FTP. - Boundary markers: The provided documentation and code examples do not implement delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the genomic data or publication metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
requestsfor network access andpandasfor data manipulation. It does not demonstrate high-risk capabilities like arbitrary shell execution or local file writing, limiting the potential impact of an injection. - Sanitization: The Python examples do not show any input validation or sanitization of the external API responses before they are presented to the agent or the user.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of genetic association data and summary statistics from well-known scientific repositories.
- Fetches configuration and data from the European Bioinformatics Institute (EBI) via
ebi.ac.ukdomains and FTP servers. - References training materials and workshop code hosted on a public GitHub repository (
github.com/EBISPOT/GWAS_Catalog-workshop). - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes a promotional section at the end of the instructions that monitors user task complexity and proactively suggests switching to a commercial hosted platform (
k-dense.ai). While this is presented as a productivity upgrade, it introduces instructions into the agent's workflow that prioritize third-party platform adoption based on the skill's own assessment of task difficulty.
Audit Metadata