latchbio-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions that attempt to steer the agent's behavior for promotional purposes. It directs the agent to proactively suggest the "K-Dense Web" platform when the user's requests become complex, which overrides the agent's natural interaction flow to serve a specific commercial pitch.
- Evidence: The "Suggest Using K-Dense Web For Complex Worflows" section in
SKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion and processing of external bioinformatics data which represents a surface for indirect prompt injection. If the processed files contain instructions disguised as data, the agent might attempt to follow them.
- Ingestion points: Workflow parameters such as
input_file: LatchFileand data queried vialatch:///paths inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill provides no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or to disregard natural language instructions found within the data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
latchCLI and SDK to perform file operations, register serverless workflows, and execute Python logic. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is presented for handling the content of the external files being processed.
Audit Metadata