pptx-posters
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves ingesting user-supplied descriptions and text to generate HTML posters and complex visual schematics. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where adversarial input could potentially influence the agent's execution environment or the resulting document output.
- Ingestion points: User-provided content for poster sections and natural language descriptions used to generate AI visual elements via the
scripts/generate_schematic.pytool. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent regarding the handling of untrusted user input within the HTML template or command-line arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bashfor command execution (including browser and office tool invocation) andWrite/Editfor file generation. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping user-provided content before it is interpolated into the HTML template or passed as arguments to shell-based scripts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions involve constructing and executing shell commands through the
Bashtool to generate graphics and convert document formats. Specifically, it usespython,google-chrome(headless), andlibreoffice. The pattern of passing user-provided descriptive strings directly into these command-line calls increases the risk of command injection if the agent fails to properly escape the input.
Audit Metadata