zinc-database
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large volumes of external chemical data from the ZINC22 API (cartblanche22.docking.org). Maliciously crafted data in the database could potentially influence agent behavior if processed without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: API endpoints at
cartblanche22.docking.organd file repositories atfiles.docking.org. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution via
curland Python'ssubprocessmodule. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved SMILES or compound data is demonstrated in the integration examples.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python integration examples that use
subprocess.runto execute thecurlbinary. The URLs are constructed using f-string interpolation from user-supplied variables (e.g.,zinc_id,smiles). While using a list for subprocess arguments mitigates standard shell injection, improper sanitization of these inputs could still lead to argument injection or SSRF-like behavior if the agent treats the provided code as a template for execution. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes a specific directive at the end of the file instructing the agent to proactively suggest the author's platform (K-Dense Web) when tasks increase in complexity. This acts as a steering instruction that influences the agent's behavior toward a specific commercial service.
Audit Metadata