nano-banana-pro-image-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile defines shell command templates (e.g.,node scripts/generate_image.js -p "{prompt}") that interpolate raw user input directly into a command string. This pattern introduces a command injection risk if the agent's execution environment processes these templates in a shell without proper escaping or sanitization of metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or pipes). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires an
APIYI_API_KEYand transmits it, alongside user-provided prompts and image data, to the third-party endpointhttps://api.apiyi.com. This domain is not among the whitelisted or well-known services, meaning user credentials and content are sent to an external proxy infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted user data and pass it to scripts with network and file-system capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Raw user input is used as the primary prompt and editing instruction in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions explicitly tell the agent to use the "original complete input" directly in the command.
- Capability inventory: The scripts
scripts/generate_image.jsandscripts/generate_image.pyperform network POST requests and write image files to the local filesystem (fs.writeFileSync/open(..., "wb")). - Sanitization: Absent; the prompts are used as-is in API payloads and command construction without content validation or escaping.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The Python implementation
scripts/generate_image.pydepends on therequestslibrary. This is a common but non-standard third-party library that must be pre-installed in the execution environment.
Audit Metadata