jev-route
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user content to determine routing, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in the task data could influence the routing decision.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied content is interpolated into JSON payloads (such as
task,requirements, andevidencefields) which are then processed by thejev-decideCLI tool as seen inSKILL.mdandassets/example.json. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured JSON schema to separate data, but there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the underlying model to ignore embedded commands within the free-text evidence fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes the
jev-decideCLI and recommends further actions to be performed by the host agent's primary tools (UI, file, mailbox). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, filtering, or escaping of the user-provided data before it is sent to the routing provider.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to interact with the local system via a CLI tool.
- Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile provides instructions for executing thejev-decidecommand to validate and process JSON request files.
Audit Metadata