tapd-idle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill's authentication client in
scripts/tapd_client.pyperforms broad scans for authentication tokens in sensitive user files beyond the skill's directory. - Evidence: The
_load_tapd_tokenfunction searches forTAPD_ACCESS_TOKENin~/.zshrc,~/.env, and several other locations in the user's home directory to automate login. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes user-generated content (requirement and bug descriptions) from the TAPD platform, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches external data via the
get_stories_or_tasksandget_bugcommands inscripts/tapd.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters to wrap external content when presenting it to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, write files, and perform network operations.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of instructional content is performed on the data fetched from the external TAPD platform.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for all core operations and provides instructions for the agent to use pipes for data transformation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes multiple examples where the agent is encouraged to pipe API results intopython3 -cfor dynamic JSON processing and reporting. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a specific command for sending data to an external webhook, which could be misused if the agent is manipulated.
- Evidence: The
send_qiwei_messagecommand inscripts/tapd.pytransmits markdown content to a URL defined by theBOT_URLenvironment variable.
Audit Metadata