skills/wvlvik/toy-skills/tapd-idle/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tapd-idle

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill's authentication client in scripts/tapd_client.py performs broad scans for authentication tokens in sensitive user files beyond the skill's directory.
  • Evidence: The _load_tapd_token function searches for TAPD_ACCESS_TOKEN in ~/.zshrc, ~/.env, and several other locations in the user's home directory to automate login.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes user-generated content (requirement and bug descriptions) from the TAPD platform, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches external data via the get_stories_or_tasks and get_bug commands in scripts/tapd.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters to wrap external content when presenting it to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, write files, and perform network operations.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of instructional content is performed on the data fetched from the external TAPD platform.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for all core operations and provides instructions for the agent to use pipes for data transformation.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md includes multiple examples where the agent is encouraged to pipe API results into python3 -c for dynamic JSON processing and reporting.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a specific command for sending data to an external webhook, which could be misused if the agent is manipulated.
  • Evidence: The send_qiwei_message command in scripts/tapd.py transmits markdown content to a URL defined by the BOT_URL environment variable.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 09:24 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tapd-idle