phase-4-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's YAML frontmatter defines a lifecycle hook that executes a local script when the agent's task is stopped.\n
- Evidence:
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/phase4-api-stop.jsin thehookssection of SKILL.md.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the agent or user to add a remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, which involves fetching tool definitions from an external service.\n - Evidence: Command to add MCP server from
https://api.bkend.ai/mcpin SKILL.md.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to the lack of input validation and boundary markers when processing project files.\n - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and write to files in the
src/api/anddocs/directories, which could contain untrusted data.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading these files.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted access to high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit, which could be misused if malicious content is processed.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill contains no logic for sanitizing or validating the content of the files before they are used in agent operations.
Audit Metadata