phase-4-api

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's YAML frontmatter defines a lifecycle hook that executes a local script when the agent's task is stopped.\n
  • Evidence: node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/phase4-api-stop.js in the hooks section of SKILL.md.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the agent or user to add a remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, which involves fetching tool definitions from an external service.\n
  • Evidence: Command to add MCP server from https://api.bkend.ai/mcp in SKILL.md.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to the lack of input validation and boundary markers when processing project files.\n
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and write to files in the src/api/ and docs/ directories, which could contain untrusted data.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading these files.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted access to high-privilege tools including Bash, Write, and Edit, which could be misused if malicious content is processed.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill contains no logic for sanitizing or validating the content of the files before they are used in agent operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 16, 2026, 11:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — phase-4-api