skill-create
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted project data to generate persistent agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: The workflow reads data from
.bkit/btw-suggestions.json,CLAUDE.md, and project source files (Steps 1 and 2) to populate the new skill's description and logic. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands when interpolating external content into the generated
SKILL.mdfile. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Read,Write,Edit,Glob,Grep, andBashtools. Furthermore, it explicitly grants these same broad permissions to every generated skill by default in the template. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation for the content retrieved from suggestion files or project code before it is written to the new skill definition.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to analyze project structure and source code. While this is functional for a development workflow, the use of shell execution on project files creates a standard but relevant attack surface if project files contain malicious filenames or paths designed to exploit shell expansion. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic instruction generation by creating new
SKILL.mdfiles based on local project context and templates. This behavior allows the agent to expand its own capability set at runtime based on the contents of the local environment.
Audit Metadata