wan-cover-plus
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/postprocess.pyto callffmpegandffprobefor video post-processing tasks, including metadata probing, audio muxing, and subtitle burning. While commands are constructed using argument lists, the binary paths and target file locations are configurable viaconfig.yamland user input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In
scripts/wan_client.py, the_encode_local_filefunction reads arbitrary local file paths provided in thereference_imagesandreference_videosfields of the input JSON. These files are Base64 encoded and transmitted to the external DashScope API (dashscope.aliyuncs.com) as media payloads. This allows for the reading and transmission of local files to a remote service if the agent is directed to process sensitive paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because user-provided text (title, subtitle, prompt, highlights) is interpolated directly into the prompt templates in
scripts/prompt_builder.pywithout sanitization or boundary markers. This content is subsequently sent to downstream generative models, potentially allowing malicious instructions in the input data to influence model output. - Ingestion points: User-provided JSON fields (
title,subtitle,prompt,highlights) processed inscripts/generate.py. - Boundary markers: None; text is directly concatenated into multi-line prompt strings.
- Capability inventory: Network requests (
requests), file read/write (Path), and subprocess execution (ffmpeg). - Sanitization: None; no escaping or validation is performed on the text content before interpolation.
Audit Metadata