skill-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/check.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute internal validation and packaging scripts likevalidate_skill.pyandpackage.py. This functionality is intended for developer verification and does not involve untrusted input flowing into shell commands.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It readsSKILL.mdfiles from multiple local directories and incorporates their content into the agent's context. A malicious skill file placed in these locations could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: The
scripts/skill_index.pyscript reads from various local roots including repository, project, and global agent skill stores (~/.claude/skills/,~/.agents/skills/, etc.).\n - Boundary markers: The
contextcommand separates skill content using Markdown headers but lacks explicit instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded directives within the skill bodies.\n - Capability inventory: The indexing tool performs file reads and metadata ranking; it does not have network access or file-write capabilities.\n
- Sanitization: Skill content is truncated to a length limit (120,000 characters) but is otherwise passed as raw text to the agent.
Audit Metadata