yt-dlp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the external command-line tools
yt-dlpandffmpegvia the Pythonsubprocessmodule to process media and verify tool availability. Evidence includessubprocess.runcalls inscripts/doctor.py,scripts/probe_url.py, andscripts/check.pyused for version checks and metadata probing. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill allows the use of user-provided cookie files (e.g.,
~/.config/yt-dlp/cookies.txt) for authenticated or age-restricted content. Access is restricted to user-supplied absolute paths, and the skill includes comprehensive rules against storing, committing, or sharing secrets within the repository. Documentation is neutral, as the skill facilitates legitimate media access using standard tool configurations and enforces user ownership of credentials. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted metadata from external URLs, representing a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: External video metadata (titles, descriptions, etc.) fetched from video hosting sites via the
scripts/probe_url.pyscript. 2. Boundary markers: Data is ingested via structured JSON output from a CLI wrapper, though no explicit prompt delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are mentioned in the SKILL.md instructions. 3. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for media downloads and file system write access to~/Downloads. 4. Sanitization:scripts/probe_url.pyacts as a filter, extracting only specific, expected fields (title, id, duration, etc.) from the rawyt-dlpJSON output before returning it to the agent, which mitigates the risk of malicious instructions in metadata influencing agent behavior.
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