matching-decomp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted legacy game binaries using Ghidra/PyGhidra. This creates a surface where malicious instructions or deceptive strings embedded in a binary could influence the agent's behavior during the iterative reconstruction of C code.
- Ingestion points: Binary files processed via
pyghidra.open_program(binary_path)inscripts/extract_decomp.pyandscripts/pcode_rename.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers are present in the scripts to isolate untrusted data extracted from the decompiler from the agent's reasoning instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to modify local source files ("Apply the single source change") and execute arbitrary build/comparison commands (
ninja,make,objdiff). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for strings or metadata extracted from the binaries before they are processed by the LLM or added to the iteration ledger.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves executing various local commands and scripts to automate the matching process. This includes build system calls (
ninja,make), comparison tools (objdiff), and local repository scripts (decomp/scripts/run_match.py,decomp/scripts/parse_compare.py). While these are necessary for the skill's primary function, they represent an execution surface for the agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/setup.mdinstructs users to install thepyghidrapackage viapip. This is a legitimate library used to bridge Python with the Ghidra reverse engineering suite.
Audit Metadata