converting-html
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted HTML data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where the converted Markdown might contain instructions that mislead the AI agent.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through HTML files, standard input (stdin), or variables in the Python/Rust code snippets.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for the agent to use delimiters (like code blocks) or specific 'ignore' instructions when outputting the converted content to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the converted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses a CLI tool and libraries to transform data, which could then be passed to other agent tools or interpreted as instructions.
- Sanitization: While the skill documents the
--preprocessand--strip-tagsflags to filter script and style tags, these do not prevent natural language prompt injections embedded in standard text nodes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent on how to execute the
html-to-markdownCLI tool. - Evidence: Multiple examples provided in
SKILL.mddemonstrate the use of shell commands to process local files and pipe stdin to the utility.
Audit Metadata