skills/xberg-io/xberg/api-server-mcp/Gen Agent Trust Hub

api-server-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The extract-url handler in SKILL.md enables fetching content from arbitrary URLs. Without explicit SSRF protections (such as IP/domain allowlisting), this could be used to probe internal network resources or exfiltrate data from restricted environments.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The extract_file and batch_extract MCP tools accept file_path parameters. This presents a local file read or Path Traversal risk, allowing an agent to potentially access sensitive system files outside the intended data directory if the implementation lacks rigorous path validation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The server is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content from file uploads and remote URLs, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: extract_handler and extract_url_handler (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Not documented; there is no mention of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed documents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill facilitates local file system access and network requests (via reqwest).
  • Sanitization: While the documentation notes multipart validation and magic byte checks, it lacks specific security controls for preventing the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the extracted text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 24, 2026, 02:27 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — api-server-mcp