api-server-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
extract-urlhandler inSKILL.mdenables fetching content from arbitrary URLs. Without explicit SSRF protections (such as IP/domain allowlisting), this could be used to probe internal network resources or exfiltrate data from restricted environments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
extract_fileandbatch_extractMCP tools acceptfile_pathparameters. This presents a local file read or Path Traversal risk, allowing an agent to potentially access sensitive system files outside the intended data directory if the implementation lacks rigorous path validation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The server is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content from file uploads and remote URLs, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
extract_handlerandextract_url_handler(documented in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Not documented; there is no mention of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates local file system access and network requests (via
reqwest). - Sanitization: While the documentation notes multipart validation and magic byte checks, it lacks specific security controls for preventing the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the extracted text.
Audit Metadata