using-firebase
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utility scripts such as
scripts/deploy.sh,scripts/deploy_functions.sh,scripts/export_firestore.sh, andscripts/import_firestore.shutilize the shellevalcommand to execute strings constructed from concatenated variables. This pattern is dangerous as it allows for arbitrary command execution if variables (such as deployment messages or file paths) are manipulated to include shell metacharacters. - Evidence in
scripts/deploy.sh:eval $CMDwhere$CMDincludes the$MESSAGEvariable derived from user-provided arguments. - Evidence in
scripts/export_firestore.sh:eval $CMDwhere$CMDincludes$BUCKETand$COLL_FLAGSderived from command-line options. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it reads and processes local project files without proper isolation or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Files within the Firebase project directory, including source code and configurations, are accessed using
Read,Glob, andGreptools. - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat file content as untrusted data or to ignore instructions embedded within those files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bashfor command execution,WriteandEditfor file system modification, andWebFetchfor network requests. - Sanitization: None. Data extracted from project files is used directly by the agent to determine logic and tool parameters.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/setup_python_functions.pyscript configures the project to retrieve dependencies from official package registries. It generates arequirements.txtfile specifying standard Google and Firebase libraries likefirebase-functionsandfirebase-admin.
Audit Metadata