agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
--executable-pathflag allows the agent to specify a path to an arbitrary local binary to be executed instead of the default browser, which could be used to launch malicious executables. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
--extensionflag permits loading arbitrary browser extensions from local paths. Malicious extensions can execute code in the context of every website visited and intercept all browser traffic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
evalandwait --fncommands allow for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code directly within the browser's context, bypassing normal interaction constraints. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
cookiesandstorage localcommands provide functionality to extract sensitive session data, including authentication tokens and private user data, which can then be saved to files or potentially sent to external endpoints. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to navigate to external URLs and ingest their content into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Content extraction commands defined in
SKILL.mdsuch asopen,snapshot,get text,get html, andconsolelogs. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdlack delimiters or specific directives to ignore instructions that might be embedded in the retrieved web content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities in
SKILL.mdincluding writing files (screenshot,pdf,state save), managing network routes, and executing arbitrary script code. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data retrieved from external web pages is implemented.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata