skills/xerxes-2/jujutsu-suki/jj/Gen Agent Trust Hub

jj

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The audit procedure defined in docs/audit.md generates a shell script at runtime by writing to /tmp/slowed.sh and then executes it by assigning it to the EDITOR environment variable during jj command execution.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The docs/audit.md file instructs the agent to use chmod +x on the dynamically created /tmp/slowed.sh script to grant it execution permissions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the agent executing shell commands (jj log, jj squash, jj git push, etc.) to interact with the version control system and manage the repository state.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to read and process external, potentially untrusted data from repository logs, diffs, and commit messages.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through commands like jj log, jj diff, and reading file contents within the .jj/ or .git/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions for content found within the repository data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the file system and perform network operations via jj git push based on its interpretation of the repository state.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the ingested repository content before it is used to influence further agent actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 07:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — jj