jj
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The audit procedure defined in
docs/audit.mdgenerates a shell script at runtime by writing to/tmp/slowed.shand then executes it by assigning it to theEDITORenvironment variable duringjjcommand execution. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
docs/audit.mdfile instructs the agent to usechmod +xon the dynamically created/tmp/slowed.shscript to grant it execution permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the agent executing shell commands (
jj log,jj squash,jj git push, etc.) to interact with the version control system and manage the repository state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to read and process external, potentially untrusted data from repository logs, diffs, and commit messages.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through commands like
jj log,jj diff, and reading file contents within the.jj/or.git/directories. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions for content found within the repository data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the file system and perform network operations via
jj git pushbased on its interpretation of the repository state. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the ingested repository content before it is used to influence further agent actions.
Audit Metadata