comprehensive-review-full-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted external data into agent prompts without sufficient isolation.
- Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder, representing the source code or codebase to be reviewed, is directly embedded into natural language prompts across all four analysis phases (e.g., Phase 1A for code quality, Phase 2A for security audits, Phase 3A for testing strategy, and Phase 4A for framework compliance). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers, XML delimiters, or triple-backtick enclosures to separate the system's instructions from the potentially untrusted code content being analyzed. This increases the risk that instructions embedded in code comments could be interpreted as agent directives.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Tasktool to orchestrate various powerful sub-agents (code-reviewer,security-auditor,deployment-engineer) that may have access to secondary tools or information. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or input validation to neutralize potential malicious instructions within the
$ARGUMENTSvariable before it is processed by the AI sub-agents.
Audit Metadata