powershell-ui-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a TypeScript wrapper (
scripts/ui_architect_wrapper.ts) that executes PowerShell scripts on the host environment usingchild_process.spawn. This provides a direct path for executing shell commands. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The wrapper script (
scripts/ui_architect_wrapper.ts) explicitly bypasses standard security restrictions by applying the-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSignedflag when spawning PowerShell. This enables the execution of local scripts that might otherwise be blocked by the system's security policy. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs several dynamic execution techniques:
- In
scripts/build_wpf.ps1, the use of[System.Windows.Markup.XamlReader]::Load()to parse UI definitions is a known vector for XAML injection, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the XAML content is manipulated. - The
scripts/create_winforms.ps1script dynamically generates new PowerShell scripts based on input parameters and writes them to the file system usingSet-Content. - The TUI logic in
scripts/design_tui.ps1uses the call operator&to execute scriptblocks provided in menu item definitions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of external UI configurations and XAML templates.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the skill through the
XamlPath,Controlshashtables, andMenuItemsparameters. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification and arbitrary command execution via PowerShell.
- Sanitization: The scripts do not perform sanitization of the XAML content or the generated script strings to prevent command or object injection.
Audit Metadata