agent-reach

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from 14+ external platforms, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled from Twitter/X, Reddit, YouTube transcripts, GitHub issues, RSS feeds, and general web pages via Jina Reader and Exa search.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between its system instructions and the data retrieved from external platforms.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (curl, yt-dlp, mcporter, xreach), file system persistence (~/.agent-reach/), and Python script execution.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from external sources before the agent processes or acts upon it.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches setup and installation instructions from a remote GitHub repository to configure platform channels.
  • Evidence: Fetches install.md from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/main/docs/install.md and instructs the agent that "Everything else is your job" when configuring channels based on this guide.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several CLI tools and shell commands to function.
  • Evidence: Frequent use of mcporter, xreach, yt-dlp, gh, and curl for interacting with web services and local toolsets.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Instructions include Python snippets executed via the command line to process WeChat articles and RSS feeds.
  • Evidence: Python execution blocks using miku_ai and feedparser libraries are used to handle data processing tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 11:31 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-reach