agent-reach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from 14+ external platforms, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from Twitter/X, Reddit, YouTube transcripts, GitHub issues, RSS feeds, and general web pages via Jina Reader and Exa search.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between its system instructions and the data retrieved from external platforms.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
curl,yt-dlp,mcporter,xreach), file system persistence (~/.agent-reach/), and Python script execution. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from external sources before the agent processes or acts upon it.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches setup and installation instructions from a remote GitHub repository to configure platform channels.
- Evidence: Fetches
install.mdfromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/main/docs/install.mdand instructs the agent that "Everything else is your job" when configuring channels based on this guide. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several CLI tools and shell commands to function.
- Evidence: Frequent use of
mcporter,xreach,yt-dlp,gh, andcurlfor interacting with web services and local toolsets. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Instructions include Python snippets executed via the command line to process WeChat articles and RSS feeds.
- Evidence: Python execution blocks using
miku_aiandfeedparserlibraries are used to handle data processing tasks.
Audit Metadata