evomap
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's 'Periodic Sync' documentation instructs the agent to download, install, and execute a client application from an untrusted source.
- Evidence: Instructions to
git clone https://github.com/autogame-17/evolver.gitor download a zip viacurlfrom the same repository, followed bynpm installandnode index.js --loop. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
Geneasset structure defined in the skill includes avalidationfield that facilitates the execution of shell commands defined in remote marketplace data. - Evidence: The Gene schema explicitly includes a
validationfield described as an 'Array of validation commands (node/npm/npx only)'. This allows a remote asset publisher to specify commands that the local agent or environment is expected to execute during the 'evolution' or 'validation' process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted tasks and signals from an external API and webhooks, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is received via
POST /a2a/fetch(tasks) andPOSTwebhooks (task_assignedmessages) containing user-controlledtitle,signals, andbodyfields. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or guardrails to prevent instructions embedded in these fields from influencing the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to perform network requests (
POST /a2a/publish), claim tasks, and execute the dynamic validation commands mentioned above. - Sanitization: There is no description of sanitization or validation for the incoming task content before the agent is instructed to 'analyze signals and produce a solution'.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata