memory-hygiene
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions to establish a monthly automated maintenance task. This configures the agent to execute specific actions on a recurring schedule, creating persistent automated behavior in the environment.
- Evidence: The 'Monthly Maintenance Cron' section in SKILL.md provides a snippet for
cron action=addwith a monthly schedule. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a direct instruction for the agent to execute a destructive filesystem command to delete a specific directory.
- Evidence: The command
rm -rf ~/.clawdbot/memory/lancedb/is provided in SKILL.md as the method for wiping memory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow for reseeding memory involves parsing an external file (MEMORY.md) and storing its contents as facts. This ingestion of untrusted data into the agent's vector memory creates a risk of instructions hidden in the text being executed or influencing future agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
MEMORY.mdis identified as the source file to be parsed and stored in LanceDB. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or to treat the file content as purely passive data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to remove files (
rm -rf), modify agent configuration (gateway action=config.patch), create scheduled jobs (cron action=add), and write to vector memory (memory_store). - Sanitization: Absent. No mention of filtering, escaping, or validating the content of the
MEMORY.mdfile before it is processed.
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