opencli-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute shell commands via the
opencliutility. It can proxy commands to other system tools such asdocker,gh(GitHub CLI),vercel, andobsidianas documented inreferences/command_reference.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of remote code through several mechanisms:
- It encourages the use of
opencli plugin install github:user/repo, which allows downloading and executing arbitrary code from any GitHub repository. - The
opencli synthesize <site>command automatically generates and executes adapter code for new websites. - The skill instructs users to download and manually install a browser extension from a non-verified GitHub release (
https://github.com/jackwener/opencli/releases). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to install external software from untrusted sources, including a global NPM package (
@jackwener/opencli) and a zip file containing a browser extension. These components are granted broad access to the user's browser sessions and system path. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a wide attack surface for indirect prompt injection by design:
- Ingestion points: It reads untrusted data from over 70 social media and news platforms (e.g.,
twitter search,reddit hot,hackernews top) as seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are specified in the instructions to help the agent distinguish between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can post to social media, download files, and execute system commands via proxied CLIs (
docker,gh, etc.). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from external sites before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata