evaluating-cosmos-policy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads an external library from an untrusted source (
github.com/moojink/robocasa-cosmos-policy.git) as a primary dependency for its RoboCasa evaluation workflow. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Code from the untrusted repository is installed and executed on the host system using
uv pip install -eandpython -m robocasa.scripts.setup_macros. This pattern grants the external code execution privileges within the user's environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The evaluation workflow relies on loading T5 text embeddings from
.pklfiles (e.g.,libero_t5_embeddings.pkl). Python'spicklemodule is inherently unsafe as it allows for arbitrary code execution during deserialization if a file is maliciously crafted or replaced. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted external data that directly influences the agent's behavior and control logic in simulation environments.
- Ingestion points: Processes external dataset statistics (
.json) and text embeddings (.pkl) specified via path arguments inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between valid data and embedded instructions within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution (
uv run,srun), file system writes for configuration, and network operations for asset downloads. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the ingested statistics or embeddings before they are interpolated into the evaluation scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata