grpo-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a reward function library (
examples/reward_functions_library.py) that includes arun_test_casesfunction. This function utilizes the Pythonexec()statement to run code strings directly at runtime.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Thecode_execution_rewardfunction inexamples/reward_functions_library.pyextracts code from model-generated completions and passes it to therun_test_casesfunction. This creates an arbitrary code execution vulnerability where the model being trained could generate and execute malicious code on the host training environment.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it executes data generated by the language model without adequate isolation or sandboxing.\n - Ingestion points: Model completions are ingested into the
code_execution_rewardfunction within theexamples/reward_functions_library.pyfile.\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or specialized instructions are present to prevent the model from generating malicious code that could be executed during the reward evaluation phase.\n
- Capability inventory: The environment executing the training script has the capability to run arbitrary Python code via the
exec()call found inexamples/reward_functions_library.py.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or sandboxing is implemented in the provided reward function code; although a comment notes the requirement for sandboxing, the functional code provided is unsafe.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata