presenting-conference-talks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes research papers which are external, untrusted data sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads compiled papers in PDF or LaTeX format to extract key insights, contributions, and architecture details (found in
SKILL.mdunder Workflow Step 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or system-level warnings to ensure the agent ignores any malicious instructions that might be embedded within the source paper's text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files to the local file system (
prs.save()in the Python script) and execute shell commands to compile the presentation (latexmk -pdf,python3 generate_slides.py). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the text extracted from the paper before it is interpolated into the Beamer LaTeX source or the Python generation script.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes local scripts and LaTeX source code to produce its final outputs.
- Evidence: The skill provides a complete Python script (
generate_slides.pyinreferences/slide-templates.md) and a LaTeX Beamer template, which are meant to be populated with paper content and then executed using the system's Python interpreter and LaTeX compiler.
Audit Metadata