supply-chain-attack-recon
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from target organizations, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Fetches content from external JS bundles via
curl, and retrievespackage.json,requirements.txt, and GitHub Actions workflow files via the GitHub API (gh api). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not wrap external content in delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curl,gh,jq,grep, anddocker, providing a significant capability set if an injection were successful. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands and utilities to perform its reconnaissance tasks.
- Evidence: Uses
curlfor network requests to registries and target websites,ghfor GitHub organization and repository enumeration, anddockerfor image inspection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs downloads from various remote sources.
- Evidence: Fetches package metadata from well-known registries including
registry.npmjs.org,pypi.org, andrubygems.org. It also suggests usingdocker pullto retrieve container images from registries like Docker Hub and GHCR. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic execution for string manipulation and logic processing.
- Evidence: Step 5 uses
python3 -cto execute a Python snippet that generates typosquatting name candidates.
Audit Metadata