publisher-wechatsync

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill assembles shell commands by concatenating user-provided inputs, such as file paths and platform identifiers (e.g., wechatsync sync "path/to/article.md"). If these inputs contain shell metacharacters, it could lead to arbitrary command execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install and run an external third-party package (@wechatsync/cli), which increases the risk of executing untrusted code if the package or its source is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external markdown files to extract metadata like titles. A malicious file could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior or bypass constraints when it presents the sync preview or results to the user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 09:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — publisher-wechatsync