score-optimizer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file references/score_program.md contains instructions that command the agent to "LOOP FOREVER" and "Never stop." It explicitly directs the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop oversight by not pausing for user confirmation during the optimization cycle, which overrides standard safety protocols.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/run_scoring.py executes an external CLI tool using subprocess.run. The path to this tool is derived from the CODEX_CLI_PATH environment variable, which could allow for the execution of untrusted binaries if the environment is misconfigured.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection in scripts/run_scoring.py because it interpolates raw content from user-provided articles directly into the prompt without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Article files are read from the assets/articles/samples/ directory by scripts/run_scoring.py.
  • Boundary markers: The script uses basic markdown headers as delimiters but provides no instructions for the model to ignore potential instructions embedded within the article text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (codex) via the subprocess.run function.
  • Sanitization: No escaping, validation, or filtering is performed on the article content before it is added to the prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 09:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — score-optimizer