feishu-to-linear
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow of processing external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from external Feishu/Lark URLs provided by the user using the Chrome MCP tool.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters to separate the document content from the agent's system instructions, nor do they include commands to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to create and update projects and issues in a Linear workspace via the Linear MCP tool, which could be abused if malicious instructions are processed from the source document.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested text to prevent it from influencing the agent's logical flow.
Audit Metadata