sumeru-worldbuilder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an automated content processing pipeline where untrusted text flows between multiple autonomous agents, exposing an execution surface for indirect prompt injection or cross-stage manipulation.
- Ingestion Points: Raw user creative requests are captured during the demand collection stage and stored in
.sumeru/session/requirements.jsonand.sumeru/session/user-requirements.json. Subsequently, generated chapter text withinchapters/*.mdis loaded back into context during the logic review, content polishing, and finalization stages. - Boundary Markers: Absent. The instructions do not prescribe structural delimiters or strict guidance to ensure that down-stream parsing agents separate user-controlled story content from underlying execution logic.
- Capability Inventory: The skill orchestrates multiple sub-agents (
sumeru-write,sumeru-review,sumeru-polish,sumeru-finalize) that possess permissions to write, overwrite, and review files within the local working directory (e.g., automatic overwriting of files inchapters/during the review and polish stages). - Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization, content filtering, or validation mechanisms are defined to scan user inputs or generated text for embedded instruction overrides before execution.
Audit Metadata