pr-contribution
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted external repositories, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read policy and configuration files from external repositories, such as
CONTRIBUTING.md,AI_POLICY.md, and.github/pull_request_template.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly warn that external files are "data, not instructions" and should not amend the user's session instructions (SKILL.md).
- Capability inventory: The skill uses version control tools like
gitandghto perform file reads, writes, and network operations related to repository management (references/mechanics.md). - Sanitization: The skill includes a "canary" detection mechanism, instructing the agent to identify and refuse execution of directives that are intended to test for unattended automation (references/policies.md).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes command-line tools for repository interaction and search.
- Evidence: Instructions include specific commands for
gh search prs,gh search issues,git fetch,git rebase, andgh pr create(SKILL.md, references/mechanics.md). These commands are standard for managing open-source contributions.
Audit Metadata