influencer-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto configure themcporterCLI tool with OAuth access tokens. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.mdwithin thePath A: MCP via mcportersection. - Context: The execution is restricted to adding/removing configuration for the
xpoztool using tokens retrieved from the vendor's authentication server. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install vendor-owned packages via standard registries.
- Evidence: Mentions
pip install xpozandnpm install @xpoz/xpozinSKILL.md. - Context: These are official libraries for the Xpoz service authored by
xpozpublic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external social media platforms, creating a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from Twitter and Instagram via
getTwitterUsersByKeywordsandgetTwitterPostsByAuthortools. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters for social media content during the analysis phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
subprocess.runand network access (urllib.request) capabilities, primarily used for authentication. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of usernames or post content is described before processing.
- Analysis: While the surface exists, the high-privilege capabilities (auth/config) do not use the untrusted data as input, significantly limiting the risk of exploitation.
Audit Metadata