influencer-discovery

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes subprocess.run to configure the mcporter CLI tool with OAuth access tokens.
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md within the Path A: MCP via mcporter section.
  • Context: The execution is restricted to adding/removing configuration for the xpoz tool using tokens retrieved from the vendor's authentication server.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install vendor-owned packages via standard registries.
  • Evidence: Mentions pip install xpoz and npm install @xpoz/xpoz in SKILL.md.
  • Context: These are official libraries for the Xpoz service authored by xpozpublic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external social media platforms, creating a potential injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from Twitter and Instagram via getTwitterUsersByKeywords and getTwitterPostsByAuthor tools.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters for social media content during the analysis phase.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has subprocess.run and network access (urllib.request) capabilities, primarily used for authentication.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of usernames or post content is described before processing.
  • Analysis: While the surface exists, the high-privilege capabilities (auth/config) do not use the untrusted data as input, significantly limiting the risk of exploitation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 10:48 PM