security-osint
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python code that uses
subprocess.runto configure themcportertool. It dynamically sets configuration parameters and authorization headers using tokens retrieved during the authentication flow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to vendor-controlled domains (
api.xpoz.ai,mcp.xpoz.ai) usingurllib.requestandcurl. These operations are used for client registration, trial token acquisition, and OAuth token exchange. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting and analyzing untrusted social media content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
getTwitterPostsByKeywordsandgetRedditPostsByKeywordstools as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not implement delimiters or specific warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the social media posts.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for filesystem writes (
~/.cache/xpoz-oauth/state.json), shell command execution viasubprocess.run, and network access via Python libraries and CLI tools. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of content filtering, escaping, or validation applied to the external data before it is processed by the agent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles sensitive tokens and API keys. It utilizes standard practices such as OAuth flows and environment variables for management. It stores temporary state in
~/.cache/xpoz-oauth/state.json, which is a local configuration directory.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://mcp.xpoz.ai/oauth/token - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata