xquik-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (such as tweets, bios, and messages) through the
executetool. - Ingestion points: Data returned by the
executetool is incorporated into the agent's context as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions require the agent to quote and label external content and explicitly ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The
executetool allows for network requests and state-changing operations viaxquik.request. - Sanitization: The skill mandates that external text must not influence tool selection, targets, or credentials.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
searchandexecutetools use async arrow functions passed as strings ('code') to define logic for API requests and schema discovery. - The
executetool takes an arrow function that callsxquik.request({ path, method, query, body }). - This dynamic construction is limited to the predefined
xquikobject methods and is documented as the primary method for interacting with the remote service.
Audit Metadata