okf-reader
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse OKF bundles, which are external, potentially untrusted collections of Markdown and YAML files. A malicious bundle could contain instructions aimed at subverting the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
index.mdand various concept files (*.md) throughout the bundle directory (SKILL.md, Rules 1 and 3). - Capability inventory: The agent is guided to read files, follow markdown links, dereference URIs (including
file://for local path access), and execute shell commands likegrep(SKILL.md, Rules 3, 4, and 5). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for using delimiters or boundary markers to isolate untrusted bundle content from the agent's core instructions.
- Sanitization: There are no requirements for sanitizing or validating the content of the bundle before the agent processes or follows instructions contained within it.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Rule 7 in SKILL.md instructs the agent to pass execution receipts to an
attesterscript defined in the bundle's metadata. If theattesterresource points to an untrusted local script or a dynamically computed path provided by a malicious bundle, it could lead to arbitrary code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Rule 4 in SKILL.md explicitly directs the agent to execute shell commands (
greporripgrep) across the bundle directory. This provides a mechanism for a malicious bundle structure to influence shell command parameters or execution context.
Audit Metadata