figma-spec-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes JavaScript snippets within the Figma plugin environment using the
figma-usetool (documented inreferences/sub-agent-prompts.md). These scripts programmatically traverse Figma's node tree to extract structured design data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: When operating in
extensionmode, the skill performs extensive read operations on the local codebase, including model definitions (app/models/,prisma/schema.prisma), routing configurations (config/routes.rb), and environment templates (.env.example). This behavior is intended for codebase analysis but represents a significant data exposure surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external Figma designs to generate technical specifications and architectural reviews, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Figma design metadata and JSON data retrieved via
figma-devandfigma-useMCP tools. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate content retrieved from Figma from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the ability to read local application source code and write multiple Markdown files to the local
docs/directory. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization, filtering, or validation of the text extracted from Figma nodes is performed before it is interpolated into the generated documentation.
Audit Metadata