animade
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/bootstrap.mjsscript retrieves package versioning and metadata from an external domain (https://animade.codyx.lol/api/v1/bootstrap) and uses this data to programmatically install code vianpm install --global. This allows a remote service to dictate which executable code is deployed and run on the host machine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to
animade.codyx.lolto fetch installation configurations and triggers NPM to download external packages. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bootstrap script utilizes
execFileSyncto executenpmcommands and the resultinganimade-clibinary. TheSKILL.mdinstructions further guide the agent to execute multiple shell commands for project management and onboarding. - [PERSISTENCE]: The automatic bootstrap process installs the
animade-clipackage globally, creating persistent executables in the system's global path that remain active across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources and local files.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
animade-cli recipes getandanimade-cli knowledge getcommands, and local files likebrief.mdinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in these data sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
execFileSyncand the CLI, as well as project modification capabilities. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data ingested from remote recipes or local project files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata