baoyu-xhs-images
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/workflows/prompt-assembly.mdfile contains explicit instructions to bypass AI safety refusals regarding sensitive or copyrighted figures, directing the agent to create 'stylistically similar alternatives' and stating 'DO NOT refuse to generate'. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation in
references/workflows/prompt-assembly.mdsuggests usingnpxto execute a script (scripts/main.ts) that is not included in the skill's source files, which introduces a dependency on unverified external code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
bashto probe the filesystem for configuration files, including paths within the user's home directory ($HOME). While these are associated with the vendor's naming conventions, the use of shell commands for filesystem probing is a significant capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content and interpolates it into prompts for image generation tools without explicit sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded commands. Ingestion points: User text pastes and file inputs during Step 1. Boundary markers: The prompt template uses horizontal rules (
---) and markdown headers. Capability inventory: Shell command execution, filesystem write access, and external tool usage. Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is defined for the input content.
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