continue-session
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to access and read sensitive session transcript files located within the user's home directory.
- Evidence: Accesses
~/.claude/projects/<project>/<session-id>.jsonlto retrieve Claude Code session history. - Evidence: Accesses files under
~/.codex/sessions/to retrieve Codex session history. - Evidence: Uses the
herdrCLI tool to query session IDs and pane metadata, potentially exposing internal session state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests historical transcript data which may contain untrusted content that could influence the agent's behavior in the current session.
- Ingestion points: Transcript files in
~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/are read into the agent's context (SKILL.md, Section 2). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between benign historical data and potentially malicious instructions embedded in the transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to "continue the work," which involves executing arbitrary tools, editing files, and performing network operations in the current session's workspace based on the read transcript.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not mention any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the transcript content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata