init-effort
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes an 'idea' from the user as its primary argument and writes it into a handoff file which is then used as the context for a new 'thinking' agent session. This creates a surface where a user could provide an idea containing malicious instructions designed to subvert the behavior or safety guidelines of the newly spawned agent session.
- Ingestion points: The
argument-hint('The idea') inSKILL.mdis the entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters, XML tags, or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when writing the user-provided idea to the handoff markdown file.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute system commands via
<worktree-tool>, interact with remote repositories (GitHub), and spawn new processes via<agent>. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the 'idea' string before it is interpolated into the handoff file or the starting prompt for the next agent session.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality involves executing shell-level commands and tools such as Git, worktree managers, and agent wrappers. While this is expected behavior for repository management, it involves high-privilege operations such as repository initialization, configuration, and remote pushing.
Audit Metadata