treehouse
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses variables such as branch names and effort labels which are passed as arguments to the
treehousecommand-line utility, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
<effort>label in the--lease-holderflag and the<branch>name in the-bflag, as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded within these user-supplied strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to terminate system processes (via
treehouse returnandtreehouse destroy --include-in-use) and perform recursive file deletion (viatreehouse destroy) as documented in theGotchassection. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for validating, escaping, or sanitizing the input strings before they are incorporated into shell commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and relies on a specific version of a tool hosted on a third-party GitHub repository (
github.com/kunchenguid/treehouse). This repository is not associated with the skill author nor is it part of a recognized trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to guide the agent in executing shell commands using the
treehousetool to manage system resources, including processes and file system paths.
Audit Metadata