skills/yahyabedirhan/skills/treehouse/Gen Agent Trust Hub

treehouse

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses variables such as branch names and effort labels which are passed as arguments to the treehouse command-line utility, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the <effort> label in the --lease-holder flag and the <branch> name in the -b flag, as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded within these user-supplied strings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to terminate system processes (via treehouse return and treehouse destroy --include-in-use) and perform recursive file deletion (via treehouse destroy) as documented in the Gotchas section.
  • Sanitization: There are no instructions for validating, escaping, or sanitizing the input strings before they are incorporated into shell commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and relies on a specific version of a tool hosted on a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/kunchenguid/treehouse). This repository is not associated with the skill author nor is it part of a recognized trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to guide the agent in executing shell commands using the treehouse tool to manage system resources, including processes and file system paths.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 20, 2026, 06:50 AM