codex
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to bypass user confirmation and safety prompts for high-risk operations. It states that "Sandbox flags need no permission prompt on this machine" and instructs the agent to use flags like
--full-autoand--sandbox danger-full-accesswithout usingAskUserQuestion, which undermines the platform's consent and safety model. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on shell execution via the
Bashtool to interact with the Codex CLI. It performs background task execution, processes exit codes, and uses/tmp/files to pipe complex inputs to shell commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and summarize untrusted data from external code repositories and CLI outputs.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads and processes repository code and the textual output of the
codex execandcodex reviewcommands. - Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or warnings provided in the instructions to the agent to treat external content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashexecution for background tasks and has the ability to write to the local filesystem (/tmp/). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of external content is present in the skill's instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README file provides installation instructions that involve cloning code from a remote Git repository (
git@github.com:skills-directory/skill-codex.git) and executing shell commands to move the content into the agent's skill directory.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata